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ABSTRACT - This paper counterpoises Carlos Escudé's 1994, 1995 and 
1997 treatment of anthropomorphic metaphors of the state, with Alexander 
Wendt's 2004 treatment of the same subject. It stresses the need for a 
historical memory in IR scholarship, suggesting that the lack of an 
epistemological equivalent to the concept of ‘discovery’ in the harder 
sciences may open the way for less than scholarly attitudes towards 
precedents, making the accumulation of knowledge less likely. It discusses 
whether or not state personhood is actually a fiction. Finally, it explores the 
consequences, for IR theory in general and peripheral realist theory in 
particular, of state personhood being indeed a harmful fiction. The author 
argues that if anthropomorphisms of the state lead to fallacy, then Hedley 
Bull’s domestic analogy is likewise fallacious. And if this is the case, the 
hierarchy of the structure of the interstate system is exposed, together with 
Waltz’s error in postulating an anarchy. 
 
 
Introduction: The problem of ‘discovery’ in IR theory  
 
I ‘discovered’ that state personhood is a fiction that can oftentimes lead to 
flawed logic and foreign policy manipulation in the mid 1980s, when I was 
called by a radio reporter for an on the air interview on the subject of the 
left of center economic policies of Argentina vis à vis its sovereign debt. 
The reporter asked for my opinion regarding the utterings of a high official 
who had stated that it was intolerable that Argentina be on its knees before 
the International Monetary Fund. I answered that, not being an economist, I 
did not feel authorized to voice my opinions on debt policy, but that there 
was one thing I was absolutely sure of: Argentina has no knees. The 
reporter was stunned, and after a silence of several seconds that must have 
seemed endless to the radio audience, his line of questioning noticeably 
shifted from a state centric, anthropomorphic discourse focused on the 
national humiliation of bowing to IMF directives, to one focused on the 
tangible consequences of different policy alternatives for the citizens of 
Argentina. 
 
It was soon clear to me not only that the phenomenon of the state as 
person fiction went well beyond everyday parlance, but also that it 
impregnated theoretical discourse and that, lo and behold, it had been 
studied before. A little library research brought to my attention David G. 
                                                
* The author’s opinions are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of 
Universidad del CEMA.  
** Investigador Principal, CONICET, and Director, CEIEG.   2 
Hale’s work on the ‘analogy of the body politic’
1 and E.H. Carr’s discussion, 
not quite en passant, of the ‘fiction of the group person’.
2  
 
Indeed, Hale focused on anthropomorphic political metaphors in the context 
of English Renaissance literature. Carr, in turn, actually defended the use of 
anthropomorphisms in relation to the state, attacking the ‘utopians’ that, in 
his day, were dead against them. In so doing, in his 1939 classic, The 
Twenty Years' Crisis, he mentioned the well known name of Léon Duguit, 
who in his 1927 Traité de droit constitutionnel had called the state as 
person fiction a ‘valueless and meaningless anthropomorphism’.
3 
 
Obviously, thought I, there is nothing new under the sun. But no less 
obvious was the total lack of a historical memory in the social sciences. And 
this phenomenon was relevant far beyond the moral issue of due credit. 
Although, epistemologically, the social sciences may be very far away from 
other scientific fields in terms of the possibility of ‘discovery’, they are even 
further away than need be if, because of the careless attitude of scholars, 
past developments are ignored and eventually forgotten. Thus, its 
practitioners become not only less ‘scientific’ than their peers in other 
sciences, but also less scholarly than their reputation assumes and their 
social role demands. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, this realization is all the more dramatic in the 
present year of 2010. Indeed, my intuition of the mid 1980s with regard to 
the cognitive distortions generated by the state as person fiction, both in 
international politics and in IR theories, had immediate consequences for 
my scholarly production. I published papers and book chapters on state 
personhood in 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997, in both Spanish and English, 
not only through ‘obscure’ Third World institutions but also through less 
obscure ones such as Harvard University.
4 Yet in his 2004 article “The State 
as Person in International Theory”,
5 Alexander Wendt ignores the sum total 
of my work on the subject, as well as that of Léon Duguit, E.H. Carr and 
D.G. Hale. And anonymous disciples of Wendt whose work was sent to me 
                                                
1 D.G. Hale, The Body Politic: A Political Metaphor in English Renaissance Literature 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1971). 
2 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 
147 149. 
3 Léon Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel (Paris : E. de Boccard, 1927), vol. I, 
chap. 5. 
4 For Escudé’s publications on the state as person fiction in English in the United 
States, see “The Anthropomorphic Fallacy in International Relations Discourse”, 
Working Paper #94 6, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, August 
1994, and chapter 2 of Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1997). For his publications on the same subject in 
Argentina, see chapter 2 of “International Relations Theory: A Peripheral 
Perspective”, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Working Paper Nº 1, June 1993; “La 
falacia antropomorfa en el discurso de las relaciones internacionales”, América 
Latina/Internacional (FLACSO/Buenos Aires), Vol. 2:1 (Fall/Winter 1995), pp. 95 
121, and chapter 2 of El realismo de los Estados débiles: la política exterior del 
primer gobierno Menem frente a la teoría de las relaciones internacionales, Buenos 
Aires: GEL, 1995.  
5 Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory”, Review of 
International Studies 30 (2004), pp. 289–316.   3 
for review by scholarly journals continue to display this curious 
obliviousness to previous work on the subject.
6 
 
On the other hand, this is not a case in which the kinship of two authors’ 
line of enquiry is not apparent. Indeed, the first paragraph of Chapter 2 of 
my 1997 Foreign Policy Theory in Menem's Argentina (which with only slight 
revisions reproduced my 1994 Harvard paper, “The Anthropomorphic 
Fallacy in International Relations Discourse”) began:  
 
“This chapter deals with the often unnoticed practical and theoretical 
consequences of the anthropomorphic language used when referring to 
states as being, for example, ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ actors who ‘suffer,’ are 
‘honored,’, are ‘humiliated’, have ‘pride’ and aspire to ‘glory.’”
 7 
 
And the abstract to my 1994 Harvard paper added: “The anthropomorphic 
fallacy has been identified in the discourse of educators and practitioners, 
as well as in that of first rate theorists such as Hedley Bull, Robert Keohane, 
                                                
6 It is not that Escudé’s work on the anthropomorphic fallacy went totally without 
notice in the Anglo American world. Among the English language scholarly citations 
published before Wendt’s 2004 paper, I have identified the following books and 
articles. From Benedict Kingsbury, “Sovereignty and Inequality”, in Andrew Hurrell 
and Ngaire Woods (eds.), Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 69: “For a sweeping critique of ‘the anthropomorphic 
fallacy in international relations discourse’, see Carlos Escudé, Foreign Policy 
Theory..., 30-31.” From Arlene B. Tickner, “Hearing Latin American Voices in 
International Relations Studies”, International Studies Perspectives, 4 (2003), pp. 
332 333: “Classical realism’s emphasis upon the state and the national interest 
defined in terms of power, is especially problematic when applied to the periphery, 
given that state centric approaches fail to specify the subject that state actions 
serve, and can legitimate specific group interests over others. Escudé describes this 
common tendency to present the state as person, in isolation from the particular 
interests represented therein, as the ‘anthropomorphic fallacy’ (49:1995).” From 
Nora Femenia, National Identity in Times of Crises: The Scripts of the Falklands-
Malvinas War (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1996), p. 37: “For (William) 
Bloom, (1990:58) the nation state as the larger collective identity has the ultimate 
or transcending claim on its people’s loyalty, and therefore it is connected with 
constructing the mythological script of nationality in some basic ways. For Kull this 
transindividual entity (1991:20) is seen as an anthropomorphic being having 
wishes, needs and intentions that may require war. When the transindividual entity 
is a collective entity such as a nation, it is still depicted as having (...) 
anthropomorphic qualities, such as when it is said that ‘the nation’s pride is 
injured.’ Escudé (1994) (calls) this attribution of qualities (...) the ‘anthropomorphic 
fallacy’”. See also Jacques E. C. Hymans, “Applying Social Identity Theory to the 
Study of International Politics: A Caution and an Agenda”, paper presented at the 
International Studies Association convention, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24 27, 
2002, p. 17; and Houchang Chehabi, “Dress Codes for Men in Turkey and Iran”, in 
Touraj Atabaki and Erik Jan Zürcher (eds.), Men of order: authoritarian 
modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah (I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 236. The 
anthropomorphic fallacy is also mentioned in some of the English language 
scholarly reviews of Foreign Policy Theory in Menem’s Argentina. Needless to say, 
in Spanish there were many more references to this conceptual development. 
7 C. Escudé 1997, p. 22.   4 
Stephen Krasner, Joseph Nye and Kenneth Waltz”.
8 Needless to say, all of 
these examples were developed in my 1997 book. 
 
Notwithstanding, the first paragraph of Wendt’s 2004 paper on the state as 
person, written a full decade after my first analysis of the phenomenon, 
began: 
 
“To say that states are ‘actors’ or ‘persons’ is to attribute to them 
properties we associate first with human beings – rationality, identities, 
interests, beliefs, and so on. Such attributions pervade social science and 
International Relations (IR) scholarship in particular. They are found in 
the work of realists, liberals, institutionalists, Marxists, constructivists, 
behaviouralists, feminists, postmodernists, international lawyers, and 
almost everyone in between.” 
 
Wendt’s ignorance of predecessors in the field is candidly acknowledged 
when he states:  
 
“Given (the widespread personification of the state in theoretical 
discourse), one might expect state personhood to be the subject of 
considerable IR scholarship, but Arnold Wolfers’ classic 1959 essay long 
remained the only sustained modern treatment of which I am aware.
9 
Recently several other relevant contributions have been made, although 
none focuses on state personhood as such.”
10 
 
And a few lines down the road, Wendt presents himself as the pioneer in the 
field, when he states:  
 
“My objectives are threefold. Given that state personhood is uncharted 
territory in IR, the first is simply to distinguish several questions one 
might ask about it (...).”
11 
 
It is not my objective here to take issue with Wendt’s sophisticated view 
that “state persons are real in at least one important sense: they are 
                                                
8 C. Escudé 1994, p. 1. 
9 Wendt here refers to Arnold Wolfers, “The Actors in International Politics”, 
reprinted in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), pp. 3–24, and to Christopher Achen’s ‘useful paper’, “When 
is a State with Bureaucratic Politics Representable as a Unitary Rational Actor?”, 
presented at the 1989 meeting of the International Studies Association, London, 
England. See Wendt 2004, pp. 291 292 
10 See Wendt 2004, p. 292. Wendt refers here to Barry Buzan, People, States, and 
Fear (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Ronen Palan and Brook Blair, “On the 
Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations”, Review of 
International Studies, 19 (1993), pp. 385–99; Erik Ringmar, ‘On the Ontological 
Status of the State’, European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 
439–66; Jens Bartelson, “Second Natures: Is the State Identical with Itself ?”, 
European Journal of International Relations, 4 (1998), pp. 295–326; Cynthia 
Weber, “Performative States”, Millennium, 27 (1998), pp. 77–95; and Ola 
Tunander, “Swedish German Geopolitics for a New Century: Rudolf Kjellen’s ‘The 
State as a Living Organism’”, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), pp. 451–
63.  
11 A. Wendt 2004 loc.cit. My emphasis.   5 
‘intentional’ or purposive actors.” He makes this claim “broadly on 
physicalist grounds, drawing on recent philosophical efforts to articulate a 




To my mind this is a fascinating notion, inasmuch as it is closely analogous 
to the doctrine of ‘universal hylomorphism’ with which the 11
th Century 
Judeo Spanish philosopher Solomon Ibn Gabirol revolutionized Catholic 
scholasticism two centuries after his death.
13 What is relevant in this 
context, however, is not the logic of Wendt’s argument in itself, but the fact 
that it is not through his forgetfulness how the social sciences in general 
and IR theory in particular are going to live up to their promise.  
 
Only with the accumulation of knowledge can a field be regarded as 
‘scientific,’ and only with a process of successive ‘discoveries’ can 
knowledge be cumulative. Indeed, the 13
th Century scholastics who refuted 
Thomas Aquinas and his teacher Albert the Great on the grounds 
established by Ibn Gabirol two centuries before seem to have been far less 
forgetful than the Andalusian philosopher’s unlikely 21
st Century disciple. 
 
From the point of view of the advancement of science, that Wendt should 
have forgotten, among others, Duguit, Carr, Hale and Escudé (never mind 
Ibn Gabirol), is serious not so much on moral grounds, and certainly not 
because of these predecessors’ shattered egos, intellectual legacy and/or 
legitimate professional interests. It is serious principally because it implies a 




Just how serious an issue it is, however, will depend on the degree to which 
work in this field can be considered a ‘scientific discovery.’ It is my 
contention that work on the state as person in international relations 
discourse should indeed be considered a scientific discovery, if it shows that 
anthropomorphic metaphors of the state can lead to a fallacious logic and to 
foreign policy decisions that involve the emotional manipulation of a state’s 
citizens.  
 
Before attempting to prove that the personifications of the state can lead to 
a fallacious logic that facilitates manipulation, however, we must delve 
                                                
12 A. Wendt, 2004 loc.cit. 
13 See Solomon Ibn Gabirol, The Fountain of Life (Charleston, SC: Forgotten 
Books/BiblioLife), 2008, translated from Latin (Fons Vitae) by Harry E. Wedeck. Ibn 
Gabirol argued that not only physical objects, but also ‘spiritual’ ones such as 
human thought, are made of matter and form. He thus innovated upon the 
Aristotelean notion that only the ‘physical’ universe is made of matter and form, 
pittting the Greek philosopher’s hylomorphism against his ‘universal hylomorphism.’ 
With due consideration of the different meanings attached to the terms ‘matter’ and 
‘physical’ in the Medieval and contemporary philosophical cultures, it seems to me 
that Wendt’s curious idea that state personhood is in some way ‘physical’ is quite 
akin to universal hylomorphism. Indeed, the ‘non reductive physicalism’ 
propounded by Wendt is closely analogous to the non reductive ‘materialism’ 
propounded by Ibn Gabirol.   6 
briefly into the issue of discovery, which is rarely discussed in the social 
sciences. Indeed, without a definition, the evaluation of a scientific 
discovery is problematic if not impossible.  
 
Following C. Blake and M. Rendall,
14 among the specialized definitions of a 
scientific discovery one of the more cited ones is that of R. Valdés Pérez: 
“discovery in science is the generation of novel, interesting, plausible and 
intelligible knowledge about the objects of study”.
15 Blake and Rendall 
attempted to move beyond this, however, surveying the opinions of twenty 
one experienced scientists from the faculty of the University of North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill), as to what constitues a scientific discovery for them. 
Through in depth interviews, a series of discovery characteristics were 
highlighted, which the authors classified into five key themes: “novelty, 




Defining the anthropomorphic fallacy 
 
It seems reasonable to say that work on certain kinds of 
anthropomorphizations of the state in IR theory and discourse —in  
particular, what I have called the anthropomorphic fallacy— will merit the 
rank of a scientific discovery if it can be shown that it meets these discovery 
criteria specified by hard scientists. 
 
Our first task, however, is to formally define the anthropomorphic fallacy in 
international relations discourse. In order to do this, in my 1994, 1995 and 
1997 publications I generated an ad hoc classification of metaphors, both 
general and specific to the field of international relations. For metaphors 
that are specific to the field, I developed two complementary classifications. 
The first classification is made up of ‘organismic metaphors’ (in turn divided 
into those related to individual feelings such as honor, pride, dignity and 
glory; those related to parts of the human body, and those otherwise 
related to the state as person fiction, as when it is said that the United 
States did this or that), and ‘mechanicist metaphors’ (such as bipolarity, 
balance of power, etc.).  
 
The second classification includes ‘innocuous metaphors’ (which help to 
conceptualize through the comparison of a concept or phenomenon with a 
more familiar one, but lack emotional effects, as might be the case of many 
mechanicist metaphors), and ‘activating metaphors’, which similarly help to 
conceptualize through comparison but have a potential for emotional 
mobilization and/or policy manipulation.  
 
                                                
14 Catherine Blake and Meredith Rendall, “Scientific Discovery: A View from the 
Trenches”, in Ljupčo Todorovski, Nada Lavrač, Klaus P. Jantke (eds.), Discovery 
science: 9th international conference, DS 2006 (proceedings), Barcelona, Spain, 
October 7 10, 2006. 
15 Cf. Blake and Rendall, loc.cit.; R. Valdés Pérez, “Principles of human computer 
collaboration for knowledge discovery in science”, in Artificial Intelligence, 107:2 
(1999), pp. 335 346. 
16 Blake and Rendall, ibid, loc.cit.   7 
Departing from here, I defined the anthropomorphic fallacy as an ‘activating 
organismic metaphor.’ On the one hand, this is a metaphor that establishes 
a comparison between a state and a living organism, whose constitutive 
elements (e.g. cells, arms, legs or feet) are essentially subordinated to the 
whole, cannot have a separate existence and have no rights. On the other 
hand, it is a metaphor that often leads (usually unintendedly) to a frame of 
mind whereby the individual is acknowledged rights only inasmuch as they 
do not conflict with the paramount interests of the state. The latter is 
unproblematically considered to be the representative of the ‘national 




The anthropomorphic fallacy - a scientific discovery? 
 
Having defined our object of study, we can now move on to determine 
whether or not the identification of this phenomenon has made the grade of 
a scientific discovery. In the present case, the ‘experimentation and theory’ 
requirement of a scientific discovery established by the UNC Chapel Hill 
survey is exemplified by the anecdote with which this paper began. When 
on the face of emotional expressions that claimed that Argentina should not 
kneel before the IMF, I retorted to the radio interviewer that Argentina has 
no knees, the focus of his discourse shifted from state centrism to citizen 
centrism. This observation can lead to empirical study through focus groups 
or other such techniques that could falsify or leave standing the hypothesis 
that some anthropomorphizations of the state can lead to fallacious 
reasoning.  
 
Similarly, analyses of the personifications of the state in the propaganda 
issued by some regimes could be systematically undertaken. An example 
that comes easily to my mind is the analysis of the presence or absence of 
such anthropomorphizations in the propaganda of the Galtieri regime in 
Argentina, justifying the invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in 1982. 
 
If it can be shown empirically that the personifications of the state do at 
times generate cognitive distortions that are useful for selling foreign 
policies that would not otherwise be popular, then it will have been proved 
that anthropomorphic metaphors lend themselves to manipulation and 
fallacy (as I postulated in 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997), and that (malgré 
Wendt) the state as person is not only a fiction, but a harmful one.  
 
In point of fact, to some extent this has already been accomplished. In her 
1996 National Identity in Times of Crises: The Scripts of the Falklands-
Malvinas War, Nora Femenia lists a series of statements made in Argentina 
by public officials, the press and common citizens quoted by the press, and 
then asserts:  
 
“The preceding statements (...) are an excellent example of what Escudé 
(1994) has called the ‘anthropomorphic fallacy’. Descriptions of the state 
as an ‘actor’, capable of developing attitudes and behaviors that only a 
living person can experience, are a product of a peculiar logic in which no 
                                                
17 C. Escudé, 1997, pp. 24 25.   8 
distinctions are made between individual citizens and larger 
organizations. Through such logic, the state becomes an end in itself. 
The state as person fallacy, concludes Escudé, has the potential for the 
mobilization of the loyalties and energies of individual citizens, thus 
helping to legitimize authoritarianism and repression.”
18 
 
Femenia’s findings are complementary to my 1994 survey of the logical 
consequences of the anthropomorphic discourse of IR theorists. I will 
mention just a couple. 
 
Kenneth Waltz, for instance, tells us that “States, like people, are insecure 
to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be 
accepted.”
19 ‘Freedom’, we must remember, is a term that is unconsciously 
endowed with positive and noble qualities. Quite unintendedly, this 
assertion is almost a glorification of tyranny, insofar as this ‘freedom’ of 
states often leads to the subjection of masses of individual men and women 
who, without consultation, are thrown into battle and destruction.  
 
Indeed, properly speaking, ‘freedom’ is a predicament (and a right) that 
applies to the human individual, not to the state. The state may be more or 
less conditioned, but (if we abide by liberal democratic premises) it is 
mainly constrained by its responsibilities towards the citizens it should 
protect. As we shall see in our Conclusions, a state that maximizes its 
‘freedom’ in the interstate system will inevitably tyrannize its citizens. If this 
is not what Waltz seeks, his choice of words should be different. 
 
More serious, because it can easily lend itself to adoption as counsel for 
policy, is Stephen O. Krasner's language. His anthropomorphisms 
sometimes reach colossal proportions, as when, for example, he says that 
“the South will be unenthusiastic about Northern efforts to change 
international norms in areas like (...) human rights”.
20 What does the 
‘South’ and its ‘enthusiasms’ mean? Who is the subject of its enthusiasms 
or lack thereof? Obviously not the people, but the elites. A small group of 
people are thus endowed by the author with legitimacy and representation 
over billions of people. Krasner's South is a monster that does not care for 
human rights. That monster, however, does not in reality exist but is 
Krasner's creation. In other words, with his language, Krasner has 
metamorphosized the existing small power elites which do not care for 
human rights, into something much bigger and more powerful that 
                                                
18 Nora Femenia, National Identity in Times of Crises: The scripts of the Falklands-
Malvinas War, pp. 96 98. References to Escudé’s anthropomorphic fallacy are 
included throughout the book, especially in chapter 2, “A Review of the Theoretical 
Landscape”. 
19 K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading MA: Addison Wesley, 1979), p. 
165 (Spanish language edition). 
20 S.D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 268. It can be argued, of course, 
that in Islamic and some Asian societies a significative portion of the people 
themselves might reject the Western notion of human rights. Inasmuch as this is 
true, smaller ‘monsters’ do exist, but they are limited to fundamentalist societies, 
and Krasner's sweeping generalization is still fallacious, especially insofar as it is 
clear that he is really referring to the states and not to the citizenries of the ‘South’.   9 
fortunately does not exist... unless people like Krasner contribute to the 
process of its social construction.  
 
Anyone cognizant of the field knows that one could go on endlessly with 
such examples, which are not irrelevant from the point of view of their 
potential feedback into both policy making and the views of the 
‘enlightened’ public. In the Latin American region at least, scholars with 
exposure to this sort of theory frequently are appointed or elected to high 
positions of government. Thus, the anthropomorphic fallacies of public 
officials, journalists and the general public are reinforced by the 
anthropomorphic fallacies of prestigious IR theorists, whose works are 
sometimes read by the former. Furthermore, when (as in the case of 
Argentina) the educational system has indoctrinated people for decades 
with diverse versions of the anthropomorphic fallacy, official rhetoric and 
scholarly discourse of this kind falls on fertile ground.
21 
 
Thus, Femenia’s findings complement my own. Oftentimes, the 
personification of the state generates cognitive failures that can distort 
foreign and domestic policy, and which have served to justify 
authoritarianism and repression of various sorts. The identification of this 
phenomenon is indeed a scientific discovery. But far from being exclusively 
my merit, it is a discovery that can at least be traced back to Hale when he 
wrote, in 1971, that: 
 
“In the history of political philosophy and polemic, the (body politic) 
analogy has been applied to many different forms of government and in 
                                                
21 For the nationalistic contents of Argentina’s educational curriculum, often 
expressed in terms of anthropomorphic metaphors, see C. Escudé, “Argentine 
Territorial Nationalism”, in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 20:1 (May 1988), 
pp. 139 155; “Education, Political Culture and Foreign Policy: The Case of 
Argentina”, Duke UNC Working Papers Series, Nº 4, November 1992; La 
‘Riconquista’ Argentina: Scuola e Nazionalismo (Fiesole, Italy: Edizioni Cultura della 
Pace, 1992); “Cultura Política y Contenidos Educativos: el Caso de Argentina”, in C. 
Barbé (ed.), Le Ombre del Passato: Dimensioni Culturali e Psicosociali di un 
Processo di Democratizzazione (Torino, Italy: G. Giappichelli Editore 1992), pp. 
111 154; El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino: Educación e Ideología, (Buenos Aires: 
Ed. Tesis/Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1990); Patología del Nacionalismo: el Caso 
Argentino (Buenos Aires: Ed. Tesis/Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, 1987); “Contenido 
Nacionalista de la Enseñanza de la Geografía en la República Argentina, 1879 
1986”, in Malvinas Hoy: Herencia de un Conflicto, A. A. Borón and J. Faúndez, eds. 
(Buenos Aires: Ed. Puntosur 1988), and “National and Territorial Identities in 
Contemporary Latin America and Europe”, in Ryszard Stemplowski (ed.), Europe 
and Latin America, Looking at Each Other? (Warsaw: Polish Institute of 
International Affairs, 2010). For lengthy citations and comments on these works, 
besides Femenia, see Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, Geopolitical Traditions: a 
century of geopolitical thought (London and New York: Routledge, 2000); Klaus 
Dodds, Pink Ice – Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London & New York, I.B. 
Tauris, 2002); Carlos A. Parodi, The Politics of South American Boundaries 
(Wesport CT and London: Praeger, 2002); Monica Esti Rein, Politics and Education 
in Argentina, 1946-1962 (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998); Lawrence E. 
Harrison, The Pan-American Dream (Boulder: Westview, 1997); and C.N. Caviedes, 
Conflict over the Falkland Islands: a never ending story?", Latin American Research 
Review, Vol. 29:2 (1994).   10 
support of a variety of opinion. In general, however, these states are 
hierarchical and authoritarian and the ideas being supported are 
conservative, stressing social order and obedience.”
22 
 
Hale adds, notwithstanding, that “for the past three centuries, extended 
organic analogies have been generally absent from discussions of political 
issues. The phrase 'body politic' persists, but as a dead metaphor rather 
than a meaningful concept for analysis or argument.”
23  
 
I concur with him on the existence of such a long term historical trend 
toward the lapsing of organismic metaphors in Western political theory 
proper (even if there have been some glaring exceptions such as Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, Emile Durkheim, and most notably German philosophers 
like J.G. Herder, J.G. Fichte, F.W. Schelling and F. Schleiermacher.) 
Notwithstanding, Hale fails to notice that, even in political theory, there is 
one big and blatant exception to the lapsing of these metaphors that brings 
us fully into the present day: the exception in the fields of international law 
and international relations. My very minor role consists of making this 
amendment to his scientific discovery. 
 
In sum, it seems clear that the identification of the anthropomorphic fallacy 
in international relations discourse meets the criteria for scientific 
discoveries set forth by the Blake and Rendall study. It not only includes 
experimentation and theory, as shown, but also builds on pre existing 
ideas. It is novel enough to surprise not only my naïve radio interviewer but 
also sophisticated theoreticians caught off guard (indeed, in his 2004 paper 
Wendt argues that state personhood is not at all a fiction, and hence much 
less a fallacy.) It lends itself to practical application, because once a source 
of fallacious reasoning is identified, educational instruments can be applied 
to the acquisition of societal immunity to the problem.  
 
Finally as regards simplicity, the survey authors present some of their 
scientists’ charming opinions, which could not be more applicable to the 
anthropomorphic fallacy: “(Says L) ‘a discovery doesn’t have to be 
something that is very hard. It could be something very simple that you can 
get to work. It doesn’t have to be tedious work or years spent. (...) As long 
as it is an elegant thing and hasn’t been thought out already; I think that’s 
fine. It’s a discovery’.
24 
 
Once we have discovery in place in a scientific culture, it is essential that 
there be a historical memory that makes it possible to link successive 
discoveries, so that knowledge is accumulated. This also requires an ethic of 
due credit. Forgetting what others have achieved before one entered the 
scene of a particular field is the best way of not having a science at all. It 
makes scientific progress impossible, limiting findings to the heyday of this 
or that scholar. 
 
 
                                                
22 D.G. Hale, p. 67. 
23 D.G. Hale, p. 70. 
24 Blake and Rendall, p. 46.   11 
Theoretical conclusions 
 
It seems clear that state personhood is a fiction that oftentimes 
degenerates into fallacious reasoning. Theoretically, this finding is of the 
greatest importance because it unmasks the perils of what Hedley Bull 
called the ‘domestic analogy,’ which is in itself another fallacy. The state is 
not to the interstate system what the individual is to the state, because the 
elements that compose the individual’s body, such as its cells, arms or legs, 
have no awareness or rights of their own, as do the individuals who 
compose a state.  
 
This is why it was argued above that ‘freedom’ is a predicament and a right 
related to the individual but not properly to the state. It was awareness of 
this fundamental difference that led Hans Morgenthau to his dictum: 
 
“The individual may say for himself: 'Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (...),' 




Indeed, state ‘freedom’ and individual freedom are fundamentally at odds 
with each other, simply because if the state is to have full ‘freedom’ to 
manoeuvre in the interstate order, it must be able to subject its population 
to whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve its ends, sometimes with 
brutal limitations of individual freedom and other civil rights, which are 
themselves subordinated to the raison d’état.  In other words: 
 
  Total state ‘freedom’ = absolute domestic tyranny 
 
This is a ‘universal law’, valid for all states. But the paradox is that it is also 
the founding principle of my theory of ‘peripheral realism’,
26 because it 
applies differently to states with different capabilities. 
 
The universal side of this law is evident in the fact that, were the United 
States to exercise total ‘freedom’ in its foreign policy, it would have to be 
capable of mobilizing its economic and human resources to the point of 
seriously violating the rights of its citizens. Fortunately, the fact is that in 
this day and age the rights and interests of its people so constrain it, that it 
                                                
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(New York: Albert P. Knopf, 1948), p. 10. 
26 For works on peripheral realism published in English, see C. Escudé, Foreign 
Policy Theory...; El realismo de los Estados débiles...; “An Introduction to Peripheral 
Realism and its Implications for the Interstate System: Argentina and the Cóndor II 
Missile Project”, in Stephanie Neuman (ed.), International Relations Theory and the 
Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 55 76, and “Peripheral 
Realism: An Argentine Theory Building Experience, 1986 1997”, in José Flávio 
Sombra Saraiva (ed.), Concepts, Histories and Theories of International Relations 
for the 21st Century: Regional and National Approaches (Brasilia: IBRI, 2009), pp. 
223 247. For a survey of the modest amount of global attention received by 
peripheral realism, see “Una investigación en el mercado de las ideas: la 
penetración global del concepto de ‘realismo periférico’ en la bibliografía 
especializada en relaciones internacionales (a noviembre de 2008)”, Universidad del 
CEMA, Working Paper Nº 387, Dec. 2008.   12 
does not even have an obligatory military service. To pour troops into Iraq 
and Afghanistan as it did in Europe, Africa and the Pacific during the Second 
World War, it would have to either change its laws or violate them. 
 
However, the weaker a state is, the closer the threshold beyond which 
exercising state ‘freedom’ leads to domestic authoritarianism and even 
tyranny. France, for example, can intervene discreetly in some of its former 
colonies without having to impose unacceptable levies and taxes on its 
citizens, but it could not intervene in the Middle East in a measure 
comparable to the United States today without oppressing its own people. 
Due to the differences in wealth and power between them, the Élysée 
Palace would have to recur to dictatorial domestic practices in order to do 
what the White House can do under democratic rule.  
 
Further down in the interstate hierarchy, it is only because its people are 
muzzled that Iran has a potentially dangerous nuclear program. Its 
underdevelopment is such that it is unable to refine most of its own oil. Its 
population, which is mostly moderate, would never vote for a nuclear 
program that comes together with humongous economic and political costs. 
The regime can play at being ‘free’, defying the West, only because it is 
dictatorial. 
 
And even further below in the hierarchy of the interstate order, North Korea 
can exercise its ‘sovereign right’ to have nuclear devices only because it 
subjects its people to the most extreme totalitarianism. Only thus can a 
pauper state concentrate its tiny resources in the production of such an 
expensive weapon, suffering such costly international sanctions as well. In 
order to be able to assert that it is as sovereign as the United States, the 
Pyongyang regime has to subject its people to virtual serfdom. 
 
The theoretical point being made here is that, when we acknowledge that 
state personhood is a fiction that leads to fallacy and policy distortions, we 
unmask the fact that the domestic analogy does not work and that it is as 
fallacious as state personhood. And once we realize that the domestic 
analogy does not work, the interstate hierarchy is dramatically exposed!  
 
Indeed, Waltzian anarchy is undone once the consequences of the discovery 
of the anthropomorphic fallacy dawn upon us. It is not true that states are 
‘like units’ except in the sense that they all have citizens to care for, and are 
therefore under the universal law established in the above equation. 
 
And it is precisely this law that sets states apart, generating a pecking order 
in the very structure of the interstate system. Very powerful states are 
inevitably rule makers because they have more ‘freedom’ (i.e., a greater 
margin of manoeuvre) in the interstate system. All other states are 
necessarily rule takers, except those that rebel against the order 
established by the oligopoly of very powerful ones, but this they can achieve 
only through domestic tyranny: they are the so called rogue states. 
 
The concealment of this hierarchical structure seems to be the underlying 
function of the state as person fiction. It would appear people are happier 
not knowing!  